SOMERTON MAN MYSTERY

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SOMERTON MAN: KGB COVER NAMES AND TACTICS


KGB COVER NAMES


Our recent posts have been in large part based on the work of Alexander Vassiliev whose notebooks on the KGB and its operational methods have provided valuable information to all Cold War researchers.

There are many interesting and I think pertinent facts in the notebooks and what you see below is I think, amongst the most valuable. It is a description of the way that cover names were used and sometimes reused by KGB operatives in those times.


VASSILEIV'S NOTEBOOKS & KGB COVER NAMES

 Cover names are often changed.  Julius Rosenberg, for example, had three different cover names during his association with the KGB.  Each cover name has its own entry with citations to the pages where it appears.  The real name entry cites where the real name appears and repeats the cover name citations as well.

 Cover names are reused.  Four different persons, for example, had the cover name “Smith” at one time or another.  When more than one person had the same cover name this index attempts to separate out the different “Smiths”.  Usually, this is without difficulty because the multiple uses are well separated by time or activity.  Occasionally, however, it is difficult and in those cases, the lack of certainty is indicated in the entry.

Identifying the real name behind a cover name.  Often this is without difficulty because the text of Vassiliev’s notebooks or the deciphered Venona messages simply provides the real name without ambiguity.  Where the real name is not provided by the text, then the description of that person’s activity, where he or she worked, where they lived, or what trips they took at a particular time may make identification possible.  In the case of the Venona decryptions, when the text did not provide a real name, most of the work of identification was done by the FBI whose field agents used the information about the activities of a cover name to pin down the real person behind it.  Often, however, the information was insufficient to establish identification.  Consequently, more than half of the cover names in this index are unidentified.  When the evidence about a cover name suggests an identification but is not conclusive, the uncertainty is noted.

Two separate but overlapping set of documentation.  Vassiliev’s notebooks contain long quoted extracts and summaries he made of KGB archival material on KGB activities in the United States from the early 1930s to the early 1950s with some scattered later material as well.  The deciphered cables of the Venona project dated from 1941 to 1950 with the bulk in the period 1943 to 1945.  Most are also about KGB activity in the United States although there are also decoded cables of other Soviet agencies as well.  There is, consequently, a considerable overlap in the two sets of material for KGB activity in the United States in the 1940s.  In a number of cases, a passage in Vassiliev’s notebooks turns out to be the complete text of a Venona cable that was only partially decoded.  Vassiliev’s notebooks and the Venona decryptions have identical real-name identification for nearly two hundred cover names.  Vassiliev’s notebooks provide the real names for more than sixty cover names that were unidentified in the Venona decryptions.  The Venona decryptions provide the real names behind nearly thirty cover names that are unidentified in Vassiliev’s notebooks.  Vassiliev’s notebooks correct misidentification of four cover names in the Venona decryptions.

Partial decoding and partial names.  In the case of the Venona decryptions, while some messages were fully decoded, most had passages that were indecipherable and sometimes names were only partially spelled.  These partial spellings are indexed with eclipses indicating the missing letters.  In both the Venona cables and Vassiliev’s notebooks often only the surname of a person is given in the text.  When originally written, this would have been perfectly understandable to those reading the message or document because they were aware of the identifies of the persons being discussed.  And even today, often the context of the name allows one to attach a given name to a surname without difficulty.  Still, however, there remain numerous surnames where the lack of information about the person prevents the attachment of a given name and leaves the person named only partially identified.  A question mark, ?, indicates that a given name or, occasionally, a surname, is missing.


3 Comments

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  1. This is a critically important piece of information, it relates to the question of cover names and reuse of names by Soviet agents in the relative time period.

    Pavel had been thought to have the cover name MAJ which was then found to be incorrect and his real cover name was STEPAN. The question is, when was this error found? From what I have read it was into the mid 1950s.

    That means that up until that time, US authorities, with their secret knowledge via the Venona decrypts, would have appended Fedosimov's file with the activities of MAJ that were really those of Stepan Zakharovich Apreysan, Acting Chief of Station New York in 1944 and Chief of Station in San Francisco in 1945. Fedosimov was not the big fish but US intelligence thought he was.

    What does that mean? It means that in the eyes of US intelligence Fedosimov would have been a prime target to become a defector. It may also mean that a mole in US intelligence could have passed that information on to the Soviets who immediately placed Fedosimov under suspicion and had him recalled.

    Now place yourself in Fedosimov's position, a recall under suspicion in those days was almost certainly a death sentence at worst and a lngthy term of imprisonment at best. In the unlikely event that he was found not guilty then, as Vassiliev points out, he would not have been allowed to leave the country. Whichever way you look at it, the Fedosimov we know is not the Fedosimov of the IAEA.

    What happened next? Fedosimov could have left the country by other, means. More to come.

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  2. sorry, not understanding the reasoning concluding "whichever way you look at it....not....IAEA"....
    There seems a lot of assumption there, with fairly minimal basis....

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  3. Yes, it's a little complex. Given that our Fedosimov was under suspicion of being a double agent then, according to Vassiliev, the options for dealing with him were:

    1. Execution
    2. A lengthy term of imprisonment
    3. Even if found innocent, he would not have been allowed to leave Russia just to be on the safe side. This third option was considered unlikely.

    Hence my response refers to option 2 or option 3, even if he was innocent he would not have been allowed to leave the country and therefore he could not have been the global roaming Fedosimov. Does that help you?

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