Thursday 26 December 2019

PUNISH ONE TO TEACH A THOUSAND: SOVIET ASSASSINATION TECHNIQUES




An umbrella gun like this was used to assassinate Markov, a Bulgarian defector in London in 1978. The gun fired a tiny pellet containing poison into Markov's leg.

In the last post, we looked at a document that revealed some of the methods used by the CIA to carry out assassinations. There were numerous specific items of interest in that post but perhaps the one that stood out for me was the fact that the CIA had considered that a large dose of morphine could kill very quickly and be very difficult to trace. That document was dated 1955.

We can take it as read that, in those early Cold War days. the CIA used assassination as a way of removing mostly leaders of unfriendly countries or who posed a threat. They certainly changed that approach in later years.

SOVIETS

But what of the Soviets? What methods and techniques did they use in those times and probably still do? The umbrella gun shown above was a method of firing a small metal capsule which released a poison int the intended victim, there were many other devices including gas guns that could deliver a dose of nontraceable poison into the face of the target, killing them in 90 seconds.

In the following document, you will also read of one of the poisons used under the name of 'Atropine', a derivative of the 'deadly nightshade' plant or 'foxglove' a form of digitalis. The same poison that Cleland thought was responsible for the death of the Somerton Man.

Of all the various methods described in the following document perhaps the use of more than one poison to kill a target thereby further complicating the substance identification process, is a standout.

SOVIET USE OF ASSASSINATION AND KIDNAPPING

The following is based on a CIA document dated 1964, it was produced by the CIA in the aftermath of the assassination of John F Kennedy:

It has long been known that the Soviet state security service (currently the KGB) resorts to abduction and murder to combat what are considered to be actual or potential threats to the Soviet regime. These techniques, frequently designated as "executive action" and known within the KGB as "liquid affairs" (Mokryye Dela), can be and are employed abroad as well as within the borders of the USSR. They have been used against Soviet citizens, Soviet emigrés, and even foreign nationals. A list of those who have fallen victim to such action over the years would be a very long one and would include even the co-founder of the Soviet state, Leon Trotsky. Several well-known Soviet assassination operations have occurred since the rise of Khrushchev attest to the fact that the present leadership of the USSR still employs this method of dealing with its enemies.

The sudden disappearance or unexpected death of a person known to possess anti-Soviet convictions immediately raises the suspicion of Soviet involvement. Because it is often impossible to prove who is responsible for such incidents, Soviet intelligence is frequently blamed and is undoubtedly credited with successes it actually.has not achieved. On the other hand, even in cases where the Soviet hand is obvious, investigation often produces only fragmentary information, due to the KGB ability to camouflage its trail. In addition, Soviet intelligence is doubtless involved in incidents that never become officially recognized as 'executive action', such as assassinations which are recorded as accidents, suicides, or natural deaths.


All of the factors cited above have helped to obscure Soviet practices in regard to assassinations and abductions outside the USSR. Certain observations can be made, however, which will help to put these practices into their proper perspective. These observations are set forth in the following paragraphs and are based on information produced by the investigation of known or suspected Soviet operations that have occurred since World War II, as well as from information supplied by defectors during this period.

Targets. The large numbers of former citizens of the USSR (and of Imperial Russia) living abroad in protest against the Soviet regime have been a continuing cause for concern to the Soviets since the early twenties. Reducing and keeping to a minimum the potential threat to the regime represented by these emigrés is one of the functions of the state security service. Soviet intelligence seeks to neutralize, discredit and destroy anti-Soviet groups by luring emigrés back to the USSR, by penetrating emigré organizations, and by kidnapping or murdering individual emigrés considered to be particularly dangerous.


Emigré leaders who participate in anti-Soviet activities have been primary targets of Soviet abduction or assassination operations. Such operations are sometimes designed to demonstrate that the Soviet regime can strike its enemies anywhere in the world. The Soviets hope thereby to create fear, unrest, confusion, and dissension within emigré organizations, and at the same time deter other emigrés from joining their ranks. The planned assassination in February 1954 of Georgiy S. Okolovich, leader of the NTS emigré organization, was to have been a particularly significant step toward achieving this goal, but the act was not carried out because of the defection of state security Captain Nikolay Khokhlov.

On the other hand, assassinations of some emigré leaders have been carried out so skillfully as to leave the impression that the victims died from natural causes. Details of some of the techniques used to achieve this were brought to light in 1961 when professional KGB assassin Bogdan Stashinskiy defected to the West and revealed that he had successfully performed two such missions. In 1957 he killed Ukrainian emigré writer Lev Rebet in Munich with a poison vapor gun which left the victim dead of an apparent heart attack. In 1959, the same type of weapon was used on Ukrainian emigré leader Stepan Bandera, although Bandera's death was never fully accepted as having been from natural causes. These cases are discussed in more detail later in this paper.


Executive action is also triggered by any signs of possible disloyalty on the part of Soviet officials abroad. The Soviets have gone to great lengths in the past to silence their intelligence officers who have defected, as evidenced by the assassination of former state security officer Ignace Reiss in 1937 and the unexplained "suicide" of former Soviet military intelligence officer Walter Krivitsky in 1941. In the post-war era, determination to prevent such defections was vividly demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempt to force the wife of Vladimir Petrov to return to the Soviet Union from Australia after his defection in April 1954. The practice of physical restraint applies with equal force to other Soviet officials who attempt to defect or are suspected of being on the verge of doing so. Examples were witnessed in Calcutta, India in January 1958 and Rangoon, Burma in May 1959. The respective victims, Aleksandr F. Zelenovskiy and Mikhail I. Strygin were both portrayed by the Soviets as mental cases, were taken into custody by means of strong-arm tactics, and were forcibly removed to the USSR in a matter of days.

Foreign nationals are sometimes victims of Soviet executive action. The targets who fall into this category may be indigenous agents who have become suspect, or former citizens of satellite countries who have turned against the Soviet regime. In the latter case, actions against such individuals are usually carried out through the corresponding satellite intelligence service, aided and abetted by Soviet state security. The abductions of Dr. Walter Linse and Bohumil Lausman exemplify this type of operation. Linse had fled East Germany in 1947 and later became a leader of the "Society of Free jurists," an anti-Communist organization that the Soviets considered particularly dangerous. He was kidnaped from West Berlin in July 1952 by agents of the East German security service, with the full knowledge and approval of Soviet state security; he was later turned over to Soviet authorities in Karlshorst, East Berlin, and eventually sentenced to imprisonment in the USSR.* Lausman, a prominent Czech anti-Communist who fled to the West in 1949, disappeared from Vienna in 1953. It was later learned that he had been kidnaped by agents of Czech intelligence, with the official sanction of Moscow. The Soviet state security rezidentura in Vienna also had been directed to assist the operation by supplying a car for transporting Lausman to Prague and arranging for the vehicle to have free passage through the Soviet Zone of Austria.

Foreign political leaders are also potential targets of Soviet executive action operations and, according to recent information, the KGB's executive action component includes such persons among its targets. There is, however, no evidence proving that any Western leader has been the victim of Soviet executive action.

Organization

The executive action component of the Soviet government is currently designated the 13th Department of the KGB intelligence directorate (First Chief Directorate). The earliest known predecessor of the 13th Department was the so-called "Directorate of Special Tasks" reportedly established within the NKVD in December 1936 for terror purposes. During World War II terror missions were performed by the NKGB Fourth Directorate, which was responsible for partisan activity behind German lines. In late 1945 or early 1946, this directorate was replaced by a unit of the MGB known as Spets Byuro #1, which was organized to retain Fourth Directorate personnel to support and direct partisan activities behind enemy lines in the event of a future war. In the summer of 1952, however, the long-range aspects of Spets Byuro #1 mission were abandoned, and emphasis was shifted to using all available agents for sabotage and other violent activities. Spets Byuro #1 was given a new, and at present still unknown, designation some time in 1953 and assigned to carry out "special action tasks," such as sabotage, political murders, and kidnappings. With the creation of the KGB in 1954, the executive action component was redesignated as the 13th Department. Although the jurisdiction of the department is global, its main target areas are the United States and members of Western treaty organizations. There is no evidence of the existence of any unit within the Soviet military intelligence component (the GRU) responsible for the type of executive action discussed in this paper, although the GRU reportedly can undertake such operations under certain circumstances.

The 13th Department is believed to be divided into sections (otdeleniye) or directions (napravleniye) by countries or groups of countries, such as, for example, the United States ("the principal enemy"), England, Latin America, etc. At Moscow headquarters, the department has approximately 50 to 60 experienced employees and was last known to be headed by a General Rodin, who under the alias Korovin had previously been the KGB resident in Great Britain. Secrecy about the work of this department is maintained through the careful selection and training of its personnel; the officers do not discuss their experience among others; department documents are not circulated.

In addition to headquarters personnel, the 13th Department has its own support officers in legal residencies in Western countries and in some satellite countries. Such support officers work under the instructions of the legal resident and the 13th Department. One of the more active groups is a unit in East Germany which numbers perhaps 20 to 30 persons. As of 1960, there was a group in China, but it probably no longer exists. Prior to 1955, there was also a group in Austria. In a country in which a support officer of the 13th Department is stationed, the legal resident and the headquarters department for that country are aware of the targets of the 13th Department in that country, although they are not aware of illegal agents who are in direct contact with the 13th Department. Although the 13th Department is the KGB's executive action component, the Emigré (Ninth) Department directs all operations, including assassination operations, against Soviet emigrés. The Emigré Department's assassination operations, however, are believed to be conducted jointly with the 13th Department and sometimes other KGB components — for example, the counterintelligence directorate (Second Chief Directorate).

The 13th Department also supports the Disinformation (12th) Department of the First Chief Directorate in the latter's covert propaganda campaigns aimed at the creation of confusion and panic in Western countries. An example is a campaign conducted, in 1959 and later, for the purpose of creating adverse world opinion toward West Germany. This campaign included setting fire to synagogues and painting swastika signs in public places, and attributing these acts to West Germans. Other operations in which both the 13th Department and the Disinformation Department are involved include attempts to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of Western governments. Sometimes this entails arranging for the dismissal of such persons from public office, but in theory, at least it could mean "eliminating" them physically.

Installations

The defector Khokhlov described two laboratories associated with the executive action department. One produced special weapons and explosive devices; the other developed poisons and drugs for "special tasks." The explosives laboratory was located near Kuchino, outside Moscow, and was responsible for the development and production of weapons, from drawing up blueprints to melting and pouring bullets in no case was assistance obtained from military ordnance or other outside agencies.

The laboratory for poisons was supposedly a large and super-secret installation. No agents were permitted access to it or even knew of its location. Khokhlov could provide no first-hand information on it. Other sources, however, have reported the existence of this type of laboratory dating back to the purges in the late 1930s. A report from one source in 1954 described an experimental laboratory within Spets Byuro #1 known as the "Chamber" (Kamera). This laboratory conducted experiments on prisoners and persons subject to execution to test the effectiveness of different powders, beverages, and liquors, and various types of injections, as well as research on the use of hypnotism to force prisoners to confess. Besides its staff, only certain high-level persons were permitted to enter its premises. Although its existence officially was kept a secret, it was generally suspected or known by many state security functionaries that a unit of this sort was maintained. The Soviet government allegedly abolished the "Kamera" in October 1953, according to an announcement made to selected state security and Party officials, attributing the establishment and operation of the laboratory solely to Beriya and his close associates. Whether or not this step actually was taken does not rule out the possibility, however, that the same type of unit continues to exist in some other form. Thus, all of the poisons and weapons discussed in this document were pre-1953 unless otherwise stated.

Training for executive action operations was conducted at a base in Moscow by a staff of instructors who specialized in such subjects as the use of small arms, jujitsu, code, wireless, driving, surveillance, and photography.

Although executive action operations outside the USSR are planned, directed, and sometimes carried out by state security staff personnel, a mission may also be performed by one or more agents recruited specifically for this purpose. Khokhlov himself, for instance, was categorically forbidden to assassinate Okolovich personally. Two German agents, Hans Kukowitsch and Kurt Weber, were to carry out the deed under Khokhlov's supervision. This reflected Soviet theory that indigenous personnel would have better access to the target, and also had the advantage of avoiding direct Soviet attribution. It appears from the Stashinskiy case, however, that security considerations ruled out the involvement of non-Soviets in more recent operations.

Even though some sources have made statements to the contrary, it appears that the agents (as opposed to staff employees like Stashinskiy) who perform executive action for the Soviets may be used for more than one mission of this nature. Khokhlov spoke of special executive action units known as "boyevaya gruppa" (literally, combat groups) which consisted of indigenous agents and/or Soviet illegal staff officers situated outside the borders of the USSR on the territory of hostile governments or in close proximity thereto. Such groups were armed and prepared to perform executive actions when required to do so, either in time of peace or war. A group of this type under the direction of the executive action department base at Karlshorst ostensibly was involved in the kidnapping of Dr. Alexander Trushnovich, an NTS leader in West Berlin, in April 1954, Khokhlov believed the abductors to have been recruited and organized by the East German security service at the request of the KGB chief at Karlshorst. The same type of group was mentioned in connection with the abduction of Dr. Linse; the actual abduction was reportedly performed by four German members of a "boyevaya gruppa" from East Germany. It is probable that such teams are a modern variation of the "mobile groups" described by a pre-war source as units dispatched from Moscow to foreign countries to assassinate Trotskyites and state security officers who refused to return to the USSR, as in the case of Reiss and possibly Krivitskv.


Techniques

Many known or suspected executive action cases in the post-war period have involved the use of poison rather than guns or explosives. It is conceivable that the Soviets tend to favor poisons because murders can be accomplished more surreptitiously in this manner and in some instances without leaving easily recognizable traces of foul play. Drugs are also used to incapacitate a person temporarily for abduction purposes, as reportedly happened in the Trushnovich case and in the kidnapping of another NTS member, Valeri P. Tremmel, from Linz, Austria in June 1954. There are, however, many unknown, uncontrollable factors in the use of poisons and drugs which limit and often preclude their usage. Probably the most important is the narrow span between a dose that will cause disability and one that will cause death. Dosages vary from one individual to another depending on weight, state of health, and how the poison enters the body. The type used obviously is determined by the result desired. It is no problem to cause death, but often difficult to control dosage successfully when the objective is to incapacitate an individual only temporarily.

There appears to be no consistency in the use of poisons by Soviet intelligence to cause disability or death, or in the repetitious use of any one drug. Chemicals that have been used in cases known or suspected to be Soviet-instigated include arsenic, potassium cyanide, scopolamine, and thallium. 

Other likely substances are atropine, barbiturates, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde, and Warfarin. 
Combinations of two or more substances may also be used, which further complicates diagnosis and tracing.

One well-publicized poisoning case involved the defector Nikolay Khokhlov. Khokhlov suffered a sudden and severe illness while attending an anti-Communist meeting in Frankfurt, Germany in September 1957. A positive diagnosis was precluded by the initial treatment given him at a German hospital, but there was evidence of his having been poisoned by a thallium derivative of arsenic and/or other chemical agents, and a strong possibility that the poison had been administered at RIS instigation. Khokhlov himself believed and allegedly had supporting medical opinion, that he had been poisoned by radio-activated thallium. He believed that the poison was of Russian origin because it was such a complicated substance that it was difficult to analyze and had been carefully prepared to leave virtually no trace. A unique mechanism for administering poison was described by a knowledgeable source as a pneumatically operated poison ice "atomizer" which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death. The equipment and techniques used in the poisoning of Rebet and Bandera are treated below in some detail as examples of the most recent and sophisticated methods in use by the KGB.

Specific Cases

I. Stashinskiy: In November 1961 a Soviet intelligence officer, Bogdan Stashinskiy, surrendered to the West German police, stating that he had, acting under official orders, assassinated two individuals during the previous few years: Lev Rebet, a Ukrainian emigré writer, and Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. In both cases, a similar type of weapon had been used: a gun that fired vaporized poison which killed almost instantly upon being inhaled. The properties of the killing agent were such that, until the defection of the assassin, both victims were officially believed to have died from heart attacks. In the case of Bandera, however, there was some unconfirmed suspicion of potassium cyanide poisoning, although there was insufficient evidence to prove it.

The Weapon: 
The weapon used to assassinate Rebet was a light-weight aluminum cylinder, 15 to 18 cm. long and approximately 3 cm in diameter, weighing about 200 grams. The cylinder was divided into three separate chambers, one of which contained liquid poison sealed hermetically into a plastic-type ampule container under low pressure. (At normal temperatures the poison would evaporate, disappearing without a trace in about two minutes.) The three components could be assembled by means of a thread that allowed one part to screw into the other. The first component was the poison ampule portion, the front end of which had a fine metallic screen. The poison ampule fitted solidly against the walls of the metal cylinder. The center component contained a piston and a piston arm which extended into the third or activating component. The latter contained a spring-mounted activating arm which, when drawn back, armed the weapon. The releasing arm was appended to the third component at an angle and was attached to the activating arm by means of a releasing catch. A small safety arm permitted the weapon to be placed in the safety position. The third component also contained a few grams of powder.

The maximum effective range of the weapon was about a one-half meter; at one and one-half meters the effect of the vapors would be questionable; and at two and one-half meters, the vapors would be totally ineffective. (The assassin was instructed to fire the weapon only inches from the face.)

The weapon was activated as follows: The activating arm was pulled back and the safety released. The weapon was then activated. It was held in the palm of the hand in such a fashion that it fired when the user pressed the releasing arm towards the activating arm. The releasing arm, when pressed, acted upon the releasing catch, permitting the spring-held activating arm to fly forward against the small charge of powder. The exploding powder (which made a noise approximating the sound of a loud handclap with the hands cupped) drove the piston arm forward, causing the piston to strike against the poison ampule. The poison was thus driven out through the fine screen in the form of a liquid spray.

Twin Barrelled Lever Activated Gun. This gun fired a poison mist at close range into
the face of a target, death followed within 90 seconds. The poison was not traceable.

The weapon used for the second assassination was similar, except that it was double-barreled. Each barrel contained a charge of poison similar to that contained in the single-barreled weapon. The two barrels could be discharged separately, or together as a unit. Thus, in the event the first charge did not kill the victim, a second attempt could be made. The two barrels were welded together, and the weapon had two releasing arms, two releasing catches, two safeties, and two activating arms. The effect of the poison was the same.

Utilization of the Weapon: For maximum effective results it is recommended that the liquid poison be shot directly into the face of the victim, in order to introduce the vapors most quickly into the respiratory system. Since the vapors rise upward very rapidly, the poison is still effective when aimed at the chest; conceivably, this would give sufficient time to allow the victim time to scream.

Effects of the Poison: 

The effect of the poisonous vapors is such that the arteries which feed blood to the brain become paralyzed almost immediately. The absence of blood in the brain precipitates a normal paralysis of the brain or a heart attack, as a result of which the victim dies. The victim is clinically dead within one and one-half minutes after inhaling these poisonous vapors. After about five minutes the effect of the poison wears off entirely, permitting the arteries to return to their normal condition, leaving no trace of the killing agent which precipitated the paralysis or the heart attack.


Allegedly, no foreign matter can be discovered in the body or on the clothes of the victim, no matter how thorough an autopsy or examination. The liquid spray can be seen as it leaves the nose of the weapon, however, and droplets can also be seen on the face of the victim.

Stashinskiy claimed that before using the weapon on his first victim, he tested it on a dog. He fired the gun directly into the dog's face, holding his hand approximately one and one-half feet from its nose. Almost immediately after the liquid spray had hit its face, the dog rolled over, without making any sound whatever. It continued to writhe for almost three minutes, however. Stashinskiy was told that the poison affected a human much sooner, causing death within one and one-half minutes.

Safety
Precautions for the User: Stashinskiy was told that neither the poisonous liquid nor the fatal fumes affected any portion of the body other than the respiratory system, and that, since it could not enter the body through the skin or the pores, one could safely place his hands into a pail of the poison. Inasmuch as the weapon was held at arm's length when fired and the liquid spray ejected forward in a conical pattern, the user, under normal conditions, is safe from the effects of the poisonous vapors. Nevertheless, as an extra precaution, Stashinskiy was provided with counteractive agents to use if he so desired.

Concealment Methods: For transportation, the weapon was transported hermetically sealed in a container, and inserted between sausages in a can which was itself hermetically sealed. It was suggested to Stashinskiy that he should carry the weapon to the site of the planned assassination wrapped in a light newspaper, in RFE personnel. Atropine is a derivative of the deadly nightshade plant; it can cause paralysis or death if taken in sufficient quantity. The amount of poison in each salt shaker was said to be 2.36% by weight of the contents. White crystalline alkaloid is indistinguishable from salt. (Unclassified, from NYT, 17 December 1959.)

III. Stein: In March 1955, Lisa Stein, an interviewer with RIAS, the American propaganda radio station in West Germany ("Radio in American Sector"), was fed candy containing the highly dangerous poison scopolamine. (Scopolamine is used in the so-called "twilight sleep." Given in small doses it induces a kind of euphoria; in larger doses, it is supposed to be a deadly poison.) It was intended that Frau Stein would become ill and would be abducted. The plan was that the agent — someone whom Frau Stein trusted and with whom she was meeting in a West Berlin café — would offer the poisoned candy toward the end of the meeting. The lady was expected to become ill while walking from the caf6 to her nearby residence. On becoming unconscious, she was to be picked up by a waiting car which would appear to be passing by chance. The plot was not carried to fruition, however, because Frau Stein did not become ill until she was near her apartment, at which point neighbors came to her aid and she was moved to a hospital. She was severely ill for 48 hours, after which an antidote was found. (Unclassified, from the testimony of Theodor Hans, formerly with U.S. Military Intelligence, Germany, September 21, 1960, before a Congressional investigating committee.)

IV. Other:
Another weapon used is described as a noiseless gas pistol, powered by a 300-volt battery, which fires a lethal, odorless, unidentified gas. The gas acts in two or three seconds and is effective up to 15 or 20 meters. The pistol has three buttons: one for arming, one for firing, and the third for recharging the battery. (After 50 firings the battery may be recharged by plugging a transformer into a normal house power source.) The piston is normally fired 20 times, very rapidly and automatically — " Bzzzd." (Although one squirt could kill, 20 squirts are emitted in order to saturate the area, inasmuch as the gun is fired at a silhouette, rather than at a point.) The gas shot by the pistol would penetrate the victim's clothing and enter the skin. There is allegedly no danger to the user.

Trends
Since World War II, and especially in the years since Stalin's death, assassination attempts abroad have become increasingly rare. Currently, the emphasis in the executive action field is placed on sabotage and sabotage planning, rather than terrorism against individuals. The Soviets now apparently resort to murder only in the case of persons considered especially dangerous to the regime and who, for one reason or another, cannot be kidnaped. A kidnaped person is obviously more valuable inasmuch as the Soviets may be able to extract from him information of interest, as well as use him for propaganda purposes by making it appear that he defected to the Soviet side of his own fee will. This course was followed in the case of Dr. Trushnovich. It is also likely that the Soviets find it increasingly difficult to find persons willing to undertake murder assignments, while the same may not be true of abduction operations. It can further be conjectured that the Soviets are now more concerned about the adverse publicity generated by Soviet assassinations in general than they were in previous years.

In this connection, comments made by state security defectors Petr Deryabin and Yurv Rastvorov in 1954 about what the Soviets would or would not do are still of interest. Both believed that the Soviets would murder one of their officials on the verge of defecting if that were the only way of preventing the act. The same would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected if thereby state secrets could be preserved, and if they believed that killing him would not bring about a more adverse situation in terms of politics and propaganda than already existed. Deryabin and Rastvorov doubted, however, that the Soviets would murder an official who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. While both granted that in particular cases the Soviets might go to any extreme, they both believed, generally speaking, that the adverse propaganda resulting from such an act would negate its original purpose. On the other hand, Khokhlov, who might have been in a better position to know, has stated without qualification that the Soviets would continue to assassinate defectors in the future. The threat of Soviet executive action against defectors is also considered a real one by Reino Hayhanen, who defected from the KGB in 1957. A still more recent Soviet intelligence source also believes that standard Soviet practice is to mount a kidnapping or assassination operation "through all intelligence opportunities" against defectors from the Soviet intelligence services.


Deryabin and Rastvorov further agreed that the Soviets, without hesitation, would forcibly return to the USSR someone on the verge of defecting at a mission abroad. This was borne out by the aforementioned Strygin and Zelenovskiy cases. Deryabin and Rastvorov also believed that the same policy would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected or one who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes if the capability existed for returning him physically to the USSR. Lastly, Deryabin believed that the assassination of an Allied official would be highly unlikely and probably unprofitable. He also doubted that the Soviets would attempt to kidnap any U.S. officials unless they were particularly knowledgeable. Such an incident would not be worth the trouble for an average official, but an important person conceivably would have sufficient information to make it worthwhile.

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Tuesday 17 December 2019

CIA ASSASSINATION MANUAL




The document below dates back to 1955, it describes in reasonable detail how assassinations were organised and carried out by CIA operatives. I should point out that this is not meant to imply that the Somerton Man was assassinated by the CIA. In fact I do not think that was the case at all.

What the document shows is that intelligence agencies at that time were prepared, organised and trained to carry out assassinations even those that were to look like an accident.

The document describes various methods and techniques including poisons that were difficult or impossible to trace.




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Sunday 8 December 2019

A SPY IN THEIR MIDST




With thanks to Pete Davo from the Big Footy forum, an intriguing story of the communist party in Australia, spies and an Adelaide connection. Pete has put a lot into this case for some years and there's no doubting his commitment. This post uncovers some long lost detail, overlooked by many including me. good work Pete!

(Extract SMH)
Born in Colac in Victoria in 1923, Pile served as a Royal Australian Air Force radar technician during the Second World War, rising to the rank of sergeant. Against the backdrop of the Western wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, he also joined the Communist Party while training at the Tocumwal RAAF base in NSW in 1943.

After he was demobbed in 1945, Pile became a Communist Party organiser in Victoria. His devotion to the cause, described by ASIO informants as ''fanatical'' and ''intense'', was such that he left his first wife, Kathleen, after she refused to join the party.

Pile moved to Adelaide in what ASIO thought were ''unusual circumstances'' in 1951. He was immediately elected to the Communist Party's state executive committee. A year later he became a full-time party organiser before becoming state secretary of the Ships Painters and Dockers Union.
Significantly, Pile was also involved with the party's ''illegal apparatus'', a network of members who avoided open political activity so that the party could operate clandestinely if the government moved to make its activities illegal. Prominent South Australian communist lawyer Elliott Johnston recalled more than four decades later that ''Horrie was sent to us by the Central Committee … to help set things up to keep the party going [in South Australia] if Menzies had succeeded in bringing in a ban.''

Johnston said Walter Seddon Clayton, a member of the party's central control commission responsible for internal discipline and security, was responsible for Pile's transfer to South Australia. Codenamed ''Klod'', Clayton was the spymaster who ran a network of Australian communist spies who passed secret government information to Soviet intelligence from 1944 to 1950.

Clayton would effectively disappear for several years in the early 1950s to avoid ASIO surveillance. Little is known of his activities in this period, but he may not have entirely ceased his espionage role.
From about 1956 Pile began to withdraw from overt party activity. In early 1959 he resigned from the Painters and Dockers and took up employment with an electrical goods company, Gerard and Goodman. Two years later he became the Adelaide sales representative for a major electronic equipment and components supplier, Jacoby Mitchell.

This was a significant development because Jacoby Mitchell was a leading supplier of electronic test equipment and instruments to the Weapons Research Establishment. As the firm's South Australian salesman and technical adviser, Pile began to visit WRE on a regular basis in early 1961.

Pile did not tell Jacoby Mitchell of his involvement with the Communist Party. Nor did he apply for a security pass and submit to a security clearance process which would have almost certainly rejected him. Instead, he visited WRE under escort and was soon passing through the main security checkpoint at least two or three times a week.

Pile was good at his job. A WRE security officer observed that ''Pile is assessed by technical personnel, with whom he deals, as being a very good technical man … Mr. Pile is a very good salesman.''

Pile's work brought him into contact with technical personnel with ''wide access to very sensitive information'' including warhead fusing systems, telemetry systems and other aspects of the Bloodhound and Thunderbird surface-to-air missile projects, the Blue Steel nuclear-tipped bomb, and the Australian Ikara anti-submarine missile. WRE security officers feared ''the possibility of him obtaining classified information is very real''.

By mid-December 1962, ASIO's Adelaide office somewhat belatedly concluded that Pile was a ''subject worthy of concentrated attention''. He was designated a ''suspect illegal'' - that is a spy - and placed under close surveillance.


SOME ADDITIONAL WORDS FROM PETEDAVO:
The post mortem has many details. One thing I can deduce is that he's probably right-handed as the nicotine stains are on the fingers of his right hand. This would suggest that he is unlikely to be whoever wrote the HC Reynolds ID card, however the prospect of him being a merchant seaman lead me to discover other mysteries such as the woman allegedly trying to fence one of the lost crates of Peking Man fossils at the top of the empire state building in the 70's who alleges that 2 people had been murdered in relation to the smuggling of these artifacts. 

Keeping an open mind is probably the hardest thing to do in any process of investigation as impatience encourages our minds to want to cut to the quickest path of resolution, and thus we will discount the improbable and categorize the too hard as far fetched or deluded, until we're forced back to those paths once the easy path hits the dead end. 

Just as I originally discounted Thomas Ambrose Keane of Williamstown, because he was still alive well after 1948. But something kept nagging me about that old army cadet record. It was the handwriting of whoever filled out his details. The T Keane written upon that form is nearly the same as the T Keane written upon that tie in the suitcase found at Adelaide railway station! So an intriguing possibility is that SM had items gifted or bought from this T Keane. 

Will searching T Keane's associates yield results? Too early to tell, and hampered by the lack of digitised records and photographs, it will be laborious but is probably the easiest lead, considering that if this mystery does have something to do with espionage then T Keane of Williamstown Victoria also was involved in the same communist party apparatuses as Horace Pile who was sent to Adelaide 2 years after SM's death to spy at Woomera. 

Why might Pile be Important to this story? He is related via marriage to Harkness.




More to follow.

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Thursday 5 December 2019

CONGRATULATIONS TO 'AN EMPTY GLASS!, FASCINATING SECRET INK/INVISIBLE INK EXAMPLES & ACROSTIC CODES


NEW ADMINS APPOINTED!


Great news for all serious followers of the Somerton Man case, the 'An Empty Glass' wiki at Fandomhas been adopted and new administrators have been appointed.

They had a big job on their hands and having cleared the pages of numbers of troll comments and banning two particular trolls, the pages have a great new look and even more sound information and examples. Thankfully, both trolls have been banned from a number of blogs and forums including this one, An Empty Glass, Big Footys and more, due to their unpleasant and aggressive behaviours.
Here's a few links to pages that hopefully will be of interest:

Skripov Case, Example Invisible Ink.

Skripov was a Soviet official based in Sydney, he used invisible ink to communicate with Kay Marshall whom he thought was an ideal recruit for the Soviets. Kay Marshall was, in fact, an ASIO agent. Note the invisible ink message is in plain English and in block capitals. This was the standard method used to communicate with agents in the field.
In the example below, you see invisible ink being used by a German Abwehr agent in WW2, he communicated with Dusko Popov who turned out to be a double agent. Note the use of plain language (French) and block capitals.
                                  
Both cases can be explored further with more images on the Anemptyglass wiki, address below

1. https://anemptyglass.fandom.com/wiki/SECRET_INKS_%26_SECRET_WRITING Examples of secret inks and secret writing with the Skripov case featured prominently, a stunning pic of the actual secret ink message that Skripov sent to Kay Marshall who was actually an ASIO agent. the note to Kay Marshall was, as was always the case with Soviet officials writing to potential recruits, was written in block capitals and in English and in another example, in French.

2. https://anemptyglass.fandom.com/wiki/BLACK_WOOLLEN_SOCKS An unusual WW1 case study of the use of invisible inks cunningly contained in a pair of socks! Maybe that's why the Somerton Man had only 1 pair of socks?

3.  https://anemptyglass.fandom.com/wiki/ACROSTIC_%27DANETTA%27_SOMERTON_MAN_CODE_PAGE  A great description of how the Somerton Man code contained the mysterious code name 'DANETTA' Includes the decode method used to find it

4. https://anemptyglass.fandom.com/wiki/ACROSTIC_%27DANETTA%27_SOMERTON_MAN_CODE_PAGE A copy of the original 'DANETTA' code found in Tibor Kaldor's last letter. It shows exactly how it was concealed, the method used and the use of an online acrostic decoder to find it in the first instance.

Both I and Clive will be playing a big part in working with the wiki, we also have a number well experienced Somerton Man researchers as part of the team, we acknowledge the help of the great peope over at the Big Footy forum for their input and first-class thinking.




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Sunday 1 December 2019

Friday 29 November 2019

DIGITALIS OVERDOSE AUTOPSY, A COMPARISON


A DIGITALIS MASSIVE OVERDOSE
EXAMPLE AUTOPSY REPORT



Following the last post regarding the finding of Cleland's notes, the document you see below is an autopsy report that dates back to 2010. You will read the results and there differences apparent between these results and those from the Somerton Man's autopsy.

There may be valid reasons for the differences, for example, the drug, Digitalis, may have changed significantly since 1948 and the effects of a massive overdose could likewise have changed. But, those changes need to be researched and explained so that we may better understand the process.

View below and download the pdf here..






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Sunday 24 November 2019

CLELANDS NOTES FOUND


J.B. CLELAND, PATHOLOGIST

For some time now it has been thought that the notes made by JB Cleland, the pathologist in the Somerton Man case had been lost.

However, a sharp-eyed member of the big footy forum on the Tamam Shud case, BlueE, dug really deep and found a reference to the notes in an Adelaide Library. Clive was able to get access to the Notes yesterday and has forwarded them to me earlier today.

There are some extremely interesting issues raised in this set of notes including the fact that there were bloodstains on the back of the mans neck and shirt, Cleland questioned whether it could have come from the mortuary slab and wondered who would have undressed the man.

He also thought it unusual that a man should choose a fairly busy location at the foot of the steps to quietly end his life. A very good point.


I have included copies of the notes in this post below:











Will be spending more time on the notes to see whether we can decipher a little more :) All input appreciated.









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Wednesday 20 November 2019

AND THEN THERE WERE THREE DEAD MEN.. PART 1.



THE THIRD DEAD MAN

On December 5th 1948 the body of 

Michael Goreloff was found..


Thanks to the tireless work of REDACTED, this new breakthrough could lead us to uncovering links between The Somerton Man, Tibor Kaldor and now Michael Goreloff. 

Brief Background

Michael was a White Russian who had arrived in Australia with his soon to be wife in 1925 from Japan. They later married in Melbourne. He was found dead on December 5th, 1948 in Prince Edward Park Sutherland, New South Wales. He had a rope wrapped twice around his neck, he was found near a small sapling a bough from which had been broken, his right wrist had been cut probably with a razor.





On November 17th, 1948, Michael had left his Elizabeth Bay home early to go to his job as a Chef at the Hotel Astra in Campbell Parade, Bondi. He was particularly good at his work and was being paid the princely sum of 20 pounds a week, a huge wage for those times. He did not arrive at work and he never returned home alive again.




In Sydney in those times, the White Russian community had been highly suspicious of the communist Reds and tensions were high between them. It was thought that Michael had been engaged in discussions with Reds and had attended a number of meetings with a group at a Sydney cafe. Something went wrong and Michael was taken,  it is thought that he was murdered by a 'Britisher'. (An interesting word, you'll find it was used in the Somerton Man's inquest papers.)

The Coroner believed that the sapling near which Michael was found, wasn't of sufficient height or strength to have allowed the man to hang himself. In fact, he commented that if this man was going to kill himself he would have chosen a much stronger tree. The first inquest was adjourned.

Some 3 years ago I wrote a post on the topic of the division between the White Russians and The Communist Party, read more  here:...

WHAT DO WE HAVE HERE?

In that first two weeks of December 1948, we have three men who turn up dead apparently from suicide and each in questionable circumstances. Two die by Poisoning, and codes found with them, we are currently researching the files regarding the cause of this third death. There are so many questions and leads to be followed up.



Michael has been placed first with a date of 5th December 1948, we put him there because at this time we do not have a confirmed date of death. For example, it could be that Michael died soon after his disappearance on 17th November 1948.

These killings certainly have the hallmarks of an espionage case, we shall see.

Redacted has been a long-time follower of the Somerton Man case, we have in common a belief that that case and this were the results of the actions of foreign agents. There is much more to follow as our joint research progresses but for now, this stunning information gives the whole SM case an intriguing new twist. There is much more to come and I am looking forward to working with Redacted and Clive on this fascinating new aspect to the SM case.









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Friday 15 November 2019

INTRODUCING A MR. FEDOSIMOV


BORIS FEDOSIMOV 2012


Is this a relative of the man that appears in our photograph below? Given that the Fedosimov surname is not particularly prevalent in the USSR or anywhere else for that matter, we would hope to be able to acquire more information on this man and his ancestors. He may or may not be related to the Pavel Fedosimov whose name appears in United Nations records and certain CIA documents that show his name as a diplomat in Libya in 1957.

I don't see any particular resemblance between the man above and the image below and he may not be related to our United Nations man either.

The big question remains, is the man in the image below the same Pavel Fedosimov that we traced to the UN and to a diplomatic posting? If he is and we can show photographic evidence to that effect then we will of course remove him from our list of candidates.

If that photographic evidence is not forthcoming or, alternatively, if we find evidence that we have two different men, then he will remain as a prime candidate.

This is the man who was named as Pavel Fedosimov by the TASS news service in 1947. At this time we have little further information about Boris but we will update you as and when any information comes to light.

A note for those new to this part of the case, in the Cold War it was common practice on all sides to use pseudonyms to further muddy the waters around the various activities of the intelligence agencies. Indeed, it was often the case that when a 'diplomat' moved from one location to another, he changed his name and passport details. They even changed their cover names regularly.

COMPARISON



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Thursday 14 November 2019

PAVEL FEDOSIMOV, HIS REAL NAME?


PAVEL  IVANOVICH FEDOSIMOV



This is a close up of the man who was referred to as Pavel Ivanovich Fedosimov in the tag that accompanied this image. And this is this picture is the man I believe is the best candidate to be the Somerton Man. It is worthy of note, that this is the only known picture of Fedosimov, despite many attempts to track down other photographs after 1947, none have been found. The name crops up several times but no photographs are known to exist apart from this one.

The big question is this, is Pavel Fedosimov his real name or did he just make use of it, was he using a pseudonym? Throughout history those engaged in espionage had a habit of using the manes of others. Whether that was Louise de Bettignies AKA Alice Dubois in WW1 or Aleksander Fomin the name known to have been used by Alexandr Feklisov, the handler for Rosenburg and Klaus Fuchs 

A lot of work has been done by this blog in uncovering as much information as possible about Fedosimov, it started with a reference from Senator Cavanagh in the Australian senate to a book called  "THE ATOM SPIES" along with his thoughts that Australia had become the dumping ground for dead spies. The book reference turned out to describe a meeting between NKVD courier Harry Gold and a big man with broad shoulders, large hands and who walked 'on his toes' at the Earl Theatre in the Bronx on December 26th, 1946.



Perspective is Reality

A question of height.

Harry Gold was of short stature, about 5 feet 2 inches, and from that perspective Gold in a later interview put the man at over 6 feet tall probably 6 feet 4 inches. Put your self in Gold's position,  a darkened foyer, a tall man walking on his toes and wearing a hat, how tall would he have looked and how tall was the Somerton man?

Measured on the slab, the Somerton Man was said to have been 5 feet 11inches in height. Now, let's stand him up straight against a wall and have him stretch up to his full height. How tall would he be now? Over 6 feet and closer to 6 feet 1 inch in height. Now put on a pair of shoes, his new height, 6 feet 2 inches. Now give him a hat and have him walk on his toes and there you have the very tall man that Harry Gold saw. No smoke and no mirrors, just plain straightforward logic.

Vassiliev's Notes

In Vassilev's notebooks, (https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/86/vassiliev-notebooks) a record of a vast number of KGB agents. Fedosimov is mentioned as someone who was suspected as being about to betray the motherland, he was a likely defector.

The Pobeda Affair

Along with a number of other Russian diplomats and employees, 'Fedosimov' was due to depart New York on the Pobeda on 30th July 1948. Whilst his name appears on the passenger list, none of the outbound passenger certificates were in fact signed for that trip.

Importantly, three others were also on the passenger list for the Pobeda, Mrs. Kasenkina and a couple, the Samarins. These three were teachers at a Russian run school for children of Soviet officials. They did not board the ship and defected to the US amidst a storm of political controversy and protests from the Russians.

When the ship, having been delayed for several hours due to the hunt for the defectors, eventually left, it headed for numerous ports including Batumi in Armenia. There were many American Armenians being repatriated to their home country on board. It had left Batumi heading for its final port of call, Odesa, a short 24-hour journey. Some hours into their trip, a major fire occurred onboard killing 2 crew and 40 passengers.

Stalin was furious making it clear that he believed there to be American Armenian spies who had been onboard and who had caused the fire. Amongst the dead was a prominent ex Chinese Nationalist deputy leader to Chiang Kai-shek, by the name of Feng Yu Hsiang. This dealt a major blow to Russias attempts to join forces with the growing Chinese Communist leadership.

John Earle Haynes

Eminent Cold War Historian, John Earle Haynes, made mention of Fedosimov and his use of a cover name MAJ and then later thought to be STEPAN. Most interestingly he states that FEDOSIMOV may have been a pseudonym. Whilst it is not certain, it is yet another step that keeps 'Fedosimov' at the top of the list of candidates fro the Somerton Man.

SUMMARY

To date we have been able to:

1. Establish the description of Fedosimov to be a close match to the Somerton Man
2. We have established that the man known as Fedosimov was suspected of being a likely defector
3. We now have some evidence that suggests the name Fedosimov may well have been a pseudonym

Significant progress has been made and we continue our research work in an effort to uncover any photographs of Pavel Fedosimov after July 1948 and other lines of interest.

With many thanks to Clive Turner for his massive efforts and support in this project.





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Monday 11 November 2019

"ANY FOOL CAN COMMIT A MURDER BUT IT TAKES AN ARTIST TO COMMIT A GOOD NATURAL DEATH.."


INSIDE THE NKVD POISON FACTORY
'THE CHAMBER' (KAMERA)



Since the early 1930's, the Russians had been experimenting and developing poisons and weaponry at a number of secret locations with one specific purpose in mind, assassination.

One of these establishments was focused purely on poisons and poison delivery techniques.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

Some background, following the assassination of President Kennedy in 1964, the CIA undertook an investigation into the capabilities of the USSR in an effort to ascertain whether the Russians had the capability and to carry out the killing. The report has been released by the CIA and it describes, in some cases in quite fine detail, methods, poisons, and equipment created and used by the Soviets up to 1964. Much of what you will read here comes from that document.

"EXECUTIVE ACTION"

'Executive Action', was also known as 'Liquid Affairs' within the ranks of the KGB and coincidentally 'Wet Jobs' within allied agencies. These were State-sanctioned and executed assassination operations. 

Their targets ranged from normal soviet citizens to high profile defectors and would-be defectors, non-resident within the USSR. It was the latter that caught my attention as you might expect.

The Poisons

"The Chamber" (Kamera). This laboratory conducted experiments on prisoners and persons subject to execution to test the effectiveness of different powders, beverages, and liquors, and various types of injections, as well as research on the use of hypnotism to force prisoners to confess. Besides its staff, only certain high-level persons were permitted to enter its premises.

Delivery methods included in food, cigarettes and of special interest, a great deal of effort went into the development of poison vapours.

Whichever was used, the selected poisons were generally undetectable. and medical examiners were often fooled into believing that the deaths that occurred were from natural causes.

 Political

Until the 1950s' it was accepted practice in the NKVD to carry out any overseas missions using indigenous agents, non-Russians, as they were most concerned about removing themselves from the actual act of assassination.  Most countries in which they had an interest in those years, had quite large and well organised Communist Party organisations, in Australia, we had the CPA. It was from the ranks of such groups that potential assassins were recruited and trained in the use of sophisticated poisons and other weapons.

'Comments made by state security defectors Petr Deryabin and Yurv Rastvorov in 1954 about what the Soviets would or would not do are still of interest. Both believed that the Soviets would murder one of their officials on the verge of defecting if that were the only way of preventing the act. 

The same would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected if thereby state secrets could be preserved, and if they believed that killing him would not bring about a more adverse situation in terms of politics and propaganda than already existed. Deryabin and Rastvorov doubted, however, that the Soviets would murder an official who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. 

While both granted that in particular cases the Soviets might go to any extreme, they both believed, generally speaking, that the adverse propaganda resulting from such an act would negate its original purpose. On the other hand, Khokhlov, who might have been in a better position to know, has stated without qualification that the Soviets would continue to assassinate defectors in the future. The threat of Soviet executive action against defectors is also considered a real one by Reino Hayhanen, who defected from the KGB in 1957. '

Poison Delivery

First, let's briefly consider the information provided by the CIA on poison delivery techniques.

There appears to be no consistency in the use of poisons by Soviet intelligence to cause disability or death, or in the repetitious use of any one drug. Chemicals which have been used in cases known or suspected to be Soviet-instigated include arsenic, potassium cyanide, scopolamine, and thallium. Other likely substances are atropine, barbiturates, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde and Warfarin. Combinations of two or more substances may also be used, which further complicates diagnosis and tracing.

As you would expect, the various poisons and techniques were developed over a period of time, thus tools used in the 50s had their origins in those that were used in the 40s. One such tool was a vapor generating canister:

'The weapon used to assassinate Rebet was a light-weight aluminum cylinder, 15 to 18 cm. long and approximately 3 cm in diameter, weighing about 200 grams. The cylinder was divided into three separate chambers, one of which contained liquid poison sealed hermetically into a plastic-type ampule container under low pressure. (At normal temperatures the poison would evaporate, disappearing without trace in about two minutes.) 

The three components could be assembled by means of a thread which allowed one part to screw into the other. The first component was the poison ampule portion, the front end of which had a fine metallic screen. The poison ampule fitted solidly against the walls of the metal cylinder. The center component contained a piston and a piston arm which extended into the third or activating component. The latter contained a spring-mounted activating arm which, when drawn back, armed the weapon. The releasing arm was appended to the third component at an angle, and was attached to the activating arm by means of a releasing catch. A small safety arm permitted the weapon to be placed in the safety position. The third component also contained a few grams of powder.

The maximum effective range of the weapon was about one-half meter; at one and one-half meters the effect of the vapors would be questionable; and at two and one-half meters, the vapors would be totally ineffective. (The assassin was instructed to fire the weapon only inches from the face.)

The weapon was activated as follows: The activating arm was pulled back and the safety released. The weapon was then activated. It was held in the palm of the hand in such a fashion that it fired when the user pressed the releasing arm towards the activating arm. The releasing arm, when pressed, acted upon the releasing catch, permitting the spring-held activating arm to fly forward against the small charge of powder. The exploding powder (which made a noise approximating the sound of a loud handclap with the hands cupped) drove the piston arm forward, causing the piston to strike against the poison ampule. The poison was thus driven out through the fine screen in the form of a liquid spray.'

Conclusion

Was a similar, but earlier developed, weapon to this canister deployed and used on the Somerton Man? How could that be if it was totally undetectable?

What of the strange case found by Ina Harvey the receptionist at the Strathmore Hotel, she thought it was some kind of needle, and this canister was only 3 cm in diameter?

I suggest that you refer back to the information that tells us that they would use a combination of poisons to further conceal the true nature of death. It had to look like a suicide and the death of the Somerton Man certainly meets that criteria plus the added confusion and uncertainty of just where and how he died.

In my view, this was the work of a professional team, supervised and trained by the NKVD but executed by someone within Australia. Our victim, I believe, was a Russian defector, a diplomat, one who failed to board the MV Pobeda in New York on July 30th, 1948. He was a senior consular official, a major in the NKVD and he was suspected of being about to defect according to Alexsander Vassiliev's notes. He used the name Pavel Ivanovich Fedosimov. We have only one, 1947, photograph of Pavel and his description, he is a very close match to the Somerton Man.

So, there we have it, a plausible and possible scenario that ties the Somerton Man, the CPA, the NKVD together and one that demonstrates the skills, tools, and techniques known to have been employed by the NKVD.

But what of the other players?  More on them in an upcoming post.

"ANY FOOL CAN COMMIT A MURDER BUT IT TAKES AN ARTIST TO COMMIT A GOOD NATURAL DEATH.."







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ABOUT US and OUR RECORD

Learn more about, when the blog started our location plus a long list of 'finds' and new evidence discovered by this blog